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The very nature of post-communism encourages corruption.
—Leslie Holmes, “Corruption and the Crisis
of the Post-Communist State”
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, corruption has been
recognized as one of the most serious problems facing the democrat-
ic transitions of Eastern European countries. Scholars and practi-
tioners alike warn that a rise of covert illegal transactions in the pub-
lic sector may reduce substantially the flow of foreign investment
and the rates of economic growth in the region. Even worse, corrupt
activities may have a damaging effect on the level of public trust in
the government and consequently erode the legitimacy of the newly
established democratic institutions.1 Therefore, there is an urgent
need to understand and explain corruption in Eastern Europe. If its
main source is the legacy of communism, then states in the region
should be more or less equally corrupt. Yet the abuse of public office
has been a much more serious threat in some postcommunist coun-
tries than in others. In this book, I explore the causes and conse-
quences of corruption after 1989. First, I identify factors that facili-
tate rent seeking and other activities that undermine the existing
mechanisms for constraint. Then, I analyze patterns of political
behavior generated by the spread of corruption in the nascent post-
communist democracies.
A better understanding of the post-1989 mechanisms of inap-
propriate exchange of favors and the context that maintains them
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will be beneficial in several ways. A thorough explanation of cor-
ruption after communism will offer insights about its scope, intensi-
ty, dynamics, penetration, and vulnerability. Thus, achieving this
goal will enable us to suggest when illegal provision of public goods
and services may become difficult to hide and costly to perform dur-
ing democratic transition. By identifying the causes of post-1989
corrupt practices, we will be able to search for possible policy solu-
tions to effectively target the actual roots of malfeasance. Learning
more about the ways in which the lack of elite integrity affects citi-
zens and their relation to politics is also especially valuable.
Democracy is more fragile in places with young institutions of rep-
resentation, immature civil society, and inexperienced voters such as
the ones in Eastern Europe. A systematic study of the effects of cor-
rupt government practices after communism will help assess the
extent of popular disappointment with elites and its potential to
demobilize and demoralize citizens.
What Have We Learned About
Corruption in Eastern Europe?
Corruption is not a new phenomenon; neither is it a new topic in the
study of politics. Ink has not been spared to describe public office
abuse and its forms and transformations. Most scholars, practition-
ers, and journalists have condemned it and only a few have not wor-
ried about its possible harmful effects. The world’s interest in under-
standing the roots of wrongdoing in the public sector increased
exponentially to reach the highest levels ever in the late 1990s to
early 2000s.2 This timing coincided with the radical economic
restructuring in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe
that had just overthrown the political tyranny of totalitarianism. For
good or for bad, one more dimension was added to the already com-
plex transitional agenda—that of dealing with corruption. Reforms
had to continue against the background of increasing cynicism
among the population, generated by investigations of scandalous
violations of public office ethics. Learning more about what politi-
cians were doing behind the scenes has been hurtful and necessary at
the same time, painful to comprehend but needed for the purposes of
prevention and cure.
2 Political Corruption in Eastern Europe
Extant literature on corruption in postcommunist countries
includes studies classifying various forms of corrupt practice in
Eastern Europe, research aimed at revealing the magnitude of the
problem during transition, and applied work (reports and working
papers) of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) investigating
abuse of power in particular countries. One notable representative of
the first cluster of research is Rasma Karklins’s The System Made Me
Do It (2005). Her typology of postcommunist corruption is a compre-
hensive classification of various manifestations of improper
exchanges in the public arena. Karklins differentiates between every-
day official-citizen interactions, within-institutional interactions, and
impacts on high-level political institutions. Her detailed list of cor-
ruption types creates a good basis for observation and description of
popular attitudes and dispositions, societal relations, and possible
anticorruption measures.
Earlier research, from roughly the 1990s until the early 2000s,
examines the significance of postcommunist corruption by exploring
worldwide data made available through Transparency International
and the World Bank. Some comparative studies document a stark dif-
ference in corruption levels between Western consolidated democra-
cies and the Eastern European transitions (Dugan and Lechtman
1998; Earle 2000). Other scholarship, including Leslie Holmes (1993,
1997) and Andras Sajo (1998), establishes a rise in corruption after
communism and proposes its structural characteristics. Noteworthy
for its empirical richness is a series of articles on the emergence of
Mafia-style networks, especially in Russia, involved in grand corrup-
tion schemes (Glinkina 1998; Volkov 2002). A third group of studies
focus on particular types of corruption; for example, Beverley Earle’s
(2000) work on bribery and the role played by Western states and
international organizations to engage the Eastern European countries
in the reduction of illegal payoffs.
Overall, the research effort in the 1990s to early 2000s deals pri-
marily with questions about the origin and spread of corruption and
links those to the ongoing process of democratic and economic trans-
formation (Kneen 2000; Volkov 2002; Philp 2002). The central con-
clusion reached by most authors is that new opportunities for embez-
zlement opened when privatization and economic restructuring were
launched while older practices managed to survive and adapt (Schmidt
2007). Rich in accounts of various corrupt deals and stories of crony-
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ism, this research lacked conceptual vigor, but provided a basis for a
future, more systematic approach to the study of corruption in Eastern
Europe. What remained particularly difficult to tackle was one chal-
lenge facing the entire field and not just the study of postcommunist
politics, namely how to define and measure corruption.
The mid- and late 2000s were marked by an expansion of the the-
matic scope and by a number of methodological achievements. By
that time, it became obvious that the long lists of anticorruption
measures proposed in previous research were not working as expect-
ed. Privatization, recognized as a main source of unethical practices,
was completed, but corruption continued to plague Eastern Europe. In
a context of growing criticism against the neoliberal approach to eco-
nomic reform, questions and doubts arose about the effectiveness of
political competition and public engagement as factors containing
corruption (Kotkin and Sajo 2002; Reed 2002). In particular, scholars
were intrigued by the counterproductive role of exposing corruption
by elites for the sole reason to attack political rivals (Krastev 2004).
Moreover, experts on Eastern Europe proposed that the anticorruption
rhetoric might have had a counterproductive effect there by under-
mining the much more important question of democratic stability
(Smilov 2007).
Civil society, praised by some for its awareness-raising and
mobilizing role (Karklins 2005; Michael 2005), was put under
scrutiny by others who cautioned against exaggerating its anticor-
ruption potential (Muddle 2003; Mingiu-Pippidi 2010). Experts
even warned about a “capture of the NGO sector” by special inter-
ests (Todorakov 2010, 16). Finally, concerns were expressed that
the broadly perceived positive role of the European Union (EU)
would weaken once the Eastern European candidate states achieve
accession (Vachudova 2009). Because of a mixed record of anticor-
ruption success, some studies turned to past legacies, including
habits of informal connections and distrust of the state, in a search
for explanations of the resilience of corrupt practices (Orlova 2005;
Holmes 2006, 183).
Research on corruption throughout the 2000s shifted the agenda
toward a more systematic empirical exploration of the causes and
effects of corruption. Scholars continued the public opinion survey
series that had begun in the late 1990s (Miller, Grødeland, and
Koshechkina 2001; Miller, Koshechkina, and Grødeland 1997;
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Mishler and Rose 2005) and accumulated more data on Eastern
European mass attitudes about the spread of corruption. New and
important steps have been made to address one thorny issue in the
study of malfeasance—the problem of measurement. To the percep-
tion-based indicators started by Transparency International and the
World Bank, Freedom House’s Nations in Transit project added the
Corruption index and applied it to Eastern Europe. Coalition 2000, a
group of Bulgarian NGOs, also launched a monitoring program that
publishes survey-based indices measuring susceptibility to and actual
experience of corruption in Southeastern Europe. Studies of public
officials’ integrity in the postcommunist world employed these indi-
cators (Earle 2000; Anderson and Gray 2006). Other index-based
measures were constructed to measure anticorruption program inten-
sity and to help assess the success of various policy instruments
(Steves and Rousso 2003; Dorhoi 2006).
In brief, the studies of corruption in post-1989 Eastern Europe
reveal that the problem is complex, widespread, and pertinacious. It
is much more serious and systemic than corruption is in consolidat-
ed democracies. We have also learned that the multifaceted charac-
ter of the transition, political, economic, and in some cases state-
building, offered even more opportunities for improper behavior
and enrichment. While comparisons of the region to other groups of
countries are empirically sound, our present understanding of why
some postcommunist countries are less corrupt than others remains
deficient. In particular, research has not been conclusive on the role
of political competition, civil society organizations, and European
integration. To the extent that existing scholarship establishes corre-
lations between corruption and particular factors, the possibility of
simultaneous effects has not been scrutinized. Thus, we are still
unable to identify with a reasonable level of confidence the determi-
nants of corruption within the group of postcommunist transitions.
Even wider is the lacuna in our knowledge about the damaging
impact of corrupt practices. Extant research focuses primarily on
business-government relations and the harm caused to firms by
bribery (Anderson and Gray 2006), yet we know little about how
corruption shapes distinct patterns of political behavior. I attempt to
fill in this gap by searching for answers to the questions about the




As mentioned above, and also admitted in the literature on numerous
occasions, defining the concept of corruption is one of the challenges
that anyone interested in studying it would face. In fact, the debate on
what is the best way to define corruption is ongoing and it is beyond
the purposes of this study to resolve the issue (Heidenheimer 1970;
Philp 1997, 2002; Johnston 2005b, 10–11). The problem is not in the
absence of definitions to draw on; quite the opposite is true—extant
literature is abundant in definitions. In particular, there are too many
opinions about the scope of the concept and the level of abstraction at
which one should define and operationalize it. The difficulty in pro-
ducing a universally accepted definition of corruption stems among
other things from culturally distinct conceptions, from law ambiguity
about what action (or nonaction) is forbidden, and from disagreement
about the inclusion of nonpublic actor interactions (Johnston 2005b,
11; Holmes 2006, 17–18).3 Yet a core set of characteristics is identi-
fied in the literature around which agreement about immoral behavior
in public office can be built.
On a theoretical level, scholars seem to agree that the general
meaning of political corruption includes “the inappropriate use of
common power and authority for purposes of individual or group gain
at common expense” (Warren 2004, 332). The most common and
brief expression that one can find, especially in recent empirical stud-
ies of corruption, is “the misuse” or “the abuse” of public power “for
private gain” or “for private advantage” (Holmes 2006, 20). Other
researchers and international organizations, such as the World Bank
and Transparency International after 2000, also concur and adopt
variants of this conceptual specification in their studies (Johnston
2005b; Lambsdorff 2007).4 In Offe’s (2004, 78) terms, defined this
way the concept implies political corruption since it clearly involves
the public realm (i.e., at least one side of the “voluntary and deliber-
ate illicit deal” must be a public officeholder).
The simple definitions used in empirical research have been dis-
puted by theoretical work connecting corruption to democratic theory
and related normative issues. Mark Warren (2004), for example, sum-
marizes the deficiencies of the modern conceptions as being norma-
tively static, excessively state-centric, integrity neutral, and discount-
ing a society’s potential for agreement. A deeper conception of
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corruption through a democratic norm of “empowered inclusion,”
Warren proposes, would better encompass the various manifestations
of the phenomenon and its harmful effects on democracy. This further
conceptualization of the improper use of public authority in various
domains of public life would help identify what might count as cor-
rupt and how one can observe it. Leslie Holmes (2006, 30), con-
cerned more about the inability of a short definition to grasp gray
areas of corruption, proposes a set of five criteria that might be of a
better use. These emphasize the involvement of “actual or aspiring”
public officials, an office with some form of decisionmaking authori-
ty, personal interest in the exchange, a secretive (“clandestine”) way
in which the deal is struck, and broad popular understanding that all
of this is corruption.
On a more practical level, different countries recognize corrup-
tion in their legislation in a variety of ways, some of them quite
detailed. For example, according to the articles of the Russian
Criminal Code used until late 1996, corruption is “the misuse of
power or of an official position, exceeding one’s powers or official
positions, the acceptance of bribes, involvement [lit. mediation—
posrednichestvo] in bribery, official forgery” (Holmes 2006, 21–22).
Chapter 1, Article 5(1), of Estonia’s Anti-Corruption Act of 1995
defines a corrupt act as “the use of official position for self-serving
purposes by an official who makes undue or unlawful decisions or
performs such acts, or fails to make lawful decisions or perform such
acts.” Provisions apply to a long list of officials, including members
of parliament, the president of the republic, ministers, mayors,
judges, and county governors (Corruption and Anti-Corruption
Policy in Estonia 2002).
The way that I define corruption in this book is mostly deter-
mined by the goal to explain the distinct spread of the phenomenon in
the Eastern European new democracies. Thus, I adopt a simple ver-
sion of the definition—the misuse of public office for private gain.
Or, to borrow from Joseph LaPalombara (1994, 336), it is public ser-
vants’ behavior “in deviation” from their “formally defined public
roles” aimed at benefiting themselves or associated others.
Throughout the book, I refer to corruption as distortions in the rela-
tionships between private and public actors that have been made
intentionally and with the purpose of private enrichment and advan-
tage. Since I am interested in the roots of systemic corruption and its
Introduction 7
impact on citizen behavior, the content of my definition includes the
entire scope of improper exchange of wealth and power. This is a
holistic approach that concurs with the understanding that one form
of corruption cannot be studied in isolation because it is related to
malfeasance in other sectors as well (Lambsdorff 2007, 28).
At the center of my inquiry is grand corruption5 (rather than
petty corruption), which provides the opportunity to examine the rea-
sons for and the impact of office abuse at the highest levels of public
authority. My inquiry is based on a conception of overall levels of
corruption rather than particular forms of it. In such terms, I am inter-
ested in the exploration of the phenomenon as “a syndrome,” as
Michael Johnston (2005b, 11–12) puts it, which indicates problems in
the performance of the entire political system. While in the course of
the investigation I refer to specific manifestations of wrongdoing,
such as bribing, illegal fund-raising, and customs rules violations, it
is the corruptness of the political system that I compare and analyze
across space and time.
Observing and Measuring Corruption
Along with the difficulties encountered when constructing a sound
conceptual definition of corruption (and, perhaps, because of them),
observing and measuring corrupt activities remain an extremely chal-
lenging enterprise. There are multiple reasons that make these tasks
so difficult to deal with. In first place is the very nature of the phe-
nomenon itself, its secrecy that hinders direct observation and quan-
tification. Breaching the rules of public-private interaction requires
hiding and concealment in order to avoid possible exposure and sanc-
tion. Even in social environments with high levels of social tolerance
of bribing, connectedness, and cronyism, a sense prevails that these
things are not right, that they should not exist in an ideal situation.
Therefore, all actors who engage in corrupt activities try to ensure
some degree of secretiveness, to escape prosecution and secure a
clean social image for themselves. Because corruption is a game
played in the dark, a valid assessment of all aspects of its study,
spread, scope, and magnitude is difficult to obtain (Lambsdorff 2007,
236–237). Creative solutions, designed to capture violations of
entrusted public authority, have been advanced in a number of stud-
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ies.6 Yet all of them face criticism for not meeting a threshold of
desired validity or for failing to enable meaningful cross-national
analyses (Sik 2002; Lambsdorff 2007). Indeed, the search for quality
techniques is ongoing.
There are two basic ways to observe and measure corruption:
objective and subjective. For obvious reasons, the former are more
valuable, but also more difficult to apply. Research can benefit from
their directness (i.e., reflection of actual occurrences of the phenome-
non) and smaller potential for bias (i.e., minimized risk for contami-
nation from sources). Examples of such indicators include convic-
tions of public officials for abuse of public office (Glaeser and Saks
2006), the incidence of misuse of privileged positions by diplomats
(Fisman and Miguel 2006), gaps between government investment
costs and the value of created public goods (Golden and Picci 2005),
and national reports to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
of bribery and embezzlement. The main weakness of these measures
is that they all fail to account for the inefficiency of national institu-
tions. Another shortcoming is that some of them are not applicable in
cross-national research because comparable data on multiple coun-
tries have not been collected.
The gathering of subjective data on corruption is performed
through opinion polls. Surveys are conducted with representatives of
the political elites, the bureaucracy, national and international finan-
cial institutions, businessmen, and ordinary citizens. The most popu-
lar among these are the Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index (TICPI), the World Bank Control of Corruption
Index (WBI), the Nations in Transit Corruption Index (NIT), and the
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
of the World Bank. With the exception of the latter, these indicators
provide composite indirect measures of corruption based on aggregat-
ed perceptions of experts and analysts. The method of data collection
is a source of criticism directed toward these index-based measures of
corruption. Thus, the TICPI and the WBI have been questioned on the
grounds of how reliable the survey-gathered information is (Golden
and Picci 2005).7
There are advantages, however, offered by the perception indexes
that should not be ignored. Conducted annually in a large number of
countries, the TICPI (since 1995) and the WBI (since 1996) have
offered opportunities for detecting cross-national patterns in the
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spread and development of corruption (Christopher J. Anderson and
Tverdova 2003; Gerring and Thacker 2004; Mauro 1995; Persson and
Tabellini 2005; Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000; Treisman 2000).
Improvements have also been in order. To address some of the prob-
lems first identified in the TICPI method, the authors of the WBI
started to assign specific weights to participant surveys on the basis
of their believed reliability (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton
1999). What also raises the level of confidence in these indirect meas-
ures is that they are highly correlated with each other, as argued by
Arvind K. Jain (2001) and others.8
Subjective data on corruption can also be gathered through public
opinion polls. Similar to the TICPI and the WBI expert surveys, this
type of information is perception based, but relies primarily on popu-
lar assessments of the spread of corrupt practices in native countries.
The World Values Survey, special editions of the EU Eurobarometer,
and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) are a few
examples of polls that have included questions measuring public per-
ceptions of how widespread or serious a problem corruption is.9
Although reflecting individual impressions, rather than actual corrup-
tion, these data can be aggregated and used for system-level compar-
isons. They are especially valuable for the study of particular corrup-
tion-related research questions.
Because one of the purposes of this study was to assess corrup-
tion levels in a large number of countries over a period of time, I
needed a measure that allows comparisons across space and over
time. As discussed above, such features are offered by the TICPI and
the WBI, which rank countries on the basis of survey assessments
made by experts, country analysts, and polls.10 In making this choice,
I considered arguments made by scholars who praised the availability
of these indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005; Lancaster
and Montinola 1997; Montinola and Jackman 2002; Persson 2002) as
well as those made by others who criticized them for inflexibility and
even bias (Sik 2002). Since direct observations on corruption levels
are difficult (if not impossible) to make for all the postcommunist
countries in this sample, for all years, and by the same methodology,
I relied on the TICPI and the WBI for many of the cross-national
empirical tests. In the analysis of party finance, I added indicators
from the BEEPS as more efficient measures of the extent to which
political parties operate through corrupt contributions. In a few
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instances, I reran the regression tests with yet another measure, the
Nations in Transit Corruption Index (NIT),11 to check the robustness
of the results and to produce more stable conclusions. In all these
analyses, the working assumption was for a strong correlation
between actual corruption and the perception of it and I discuss the
results in terms of perceived corruption.
For the study of the effects of corruption on political behavior, I
employed public opinion data from the third wave of the World
Values Survey and the CSES Module 2. Two important reasons stand
behind this choice of data sources. First, attitudes toward political
institutions and voting decisions form at the microlevel in the minds
of individual citizens who experience the positives and the negatives
of the political process. Survey data can offer such information on
people’s confidence in the government and their sense of political
efficacy and voter mobilization. Second, in this case perceptions of
corruption appear even more relevant than actual corruption (which,
in fact, might be lower). What is more important is not how corrupt a
country is in reality, but how widespread individual citizens feel it is.
After all, it is individuals’ perceptions that politicians are very corrupt
that would undermine (if at all) their trust in national institutions and
desire to participate in public life.
Other Methodological Issues
Undertaking an empirical study of corruption is not an easy task.
Overall, there are at least three sets of difficulties that researchers
may face in a comparative cross-national study of corrupt behavior.
The first group of problems is associated with the already discussed
methods of observation and measurement. In brief, results from the
empirical tests may be sensitive to the particular indicator used in the
analysis. To avoid possible contamination, in all chapters of the book
I applied more than one measure of corruption and reestimated the
models with them. The results are quite stable across different speci-
fications of the indicators, something that secures robust findings and
strengthens the conclusions at the end. Second, possible endogeneity,
inherent to this type of research, sometimes makes it difficult to
establish causal directions with certainty (Goel and Nelson 2005).
For example, is it that liberalization of trade creates fewer opportuni-
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ties for bribery or that states with more intensive corrupt activity
choose to have more closed trade policies? To cope with this prob-
lem, I introduced lagged independent variables to model effects
whose direction might be dubious.
Third, corruption is a multifaceted problem, quite complex to dis-
sect and to comprehend. My approach to this complexity was twofold.
I dealt with it theoretically by examining both internal (domestic) and
external (international) factors affecting corruptiveness. The central
arguments in each chapter are made from a rational choice perspec-
tive, yet I do not turn a blind eye to alternative explanations including
possible sociological and cultural sources of malfeasance.
Methodologically, the analyses were designed at the macro- and at the
microlevel, allowing for cross-national comparisons and for inferences
made from empirical tests on individuals’ behavior. Furthermore, I
used a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods of data analysis.
These include descriptive statistics, measures of association, panel
data and logistic multivariate regression, path analysis, and a case
study revealing the mechanisms of corrupt networks in a single
country.
To my knowledge, this is the first study that investigated the
experience with corruption of such a large number of former Soviet
bloc nations. Geographically, the scope of the study included fifteen
postcommunist countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. The time span in
most of the analysis was between 1996 (the first comparable cross-
national data on corruption) and 2008. When I explored the impact of
the EU on reducing corruption, I included one more Balkan country,
Serbia, which together with Albania formed a group of late accession
states. I excluded Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, and
the former Soviet Caucasian and Central Asian republics. The former
two had to resolve stateness problems during most of the time under
study here. The rest of the omitted countries either have unresolved
border conflict problems or have had mixed success in establishing
democratic freedoms.
In a final note related to methodology, I would like to emphasize
that any inquiry on corruption, especially a large-N cross-national
study, is deemed to face the challenge of data quality. I already dis-
cussed at length the problems related to observing corrupt activities.
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In many instances, accurate measures of the factors that cause cor-
ruption are also hard to find for all countries and for the entire period
of time under investigation. I tried to complete this task to the maxi-
mum possible degree by gathering information from the same
sources and through the same methodological techniques. For exam-
ple, much of the remaining data came from reputable institutions
such as the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, the
Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, the European Commission
(EC), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).
Especially challenging was the task of collecting information for the
investigation of informal networks in Bulgaria. All sources that I
managed to find for the analysis in this case study are publicly avail-
able: newspaper articles, interviews with politicians and business-
men, and materials published by investigative journalists. I refrained
from using information that was impossible to double-check and to
verify.12
What the Book Does and What It Does Not Do
It is important at this point to clearly delineate what I explain in this
book and how I do it as well as what I do not claim as its domain. As
elaborated earlier, there are dozens of studies investigating corrup-
tion that were published in the past ten to twenty years. These are
scholarly works, expert reports released by international organiza-
tions, and working papers produced by nongovernmental or civil
society groups. In this difficult-to-navigate sea of literature, one can
find theoretical and empirical pieces, case studies of single coun-
tries, and analyses of nations from all over the globe as well as work
authored by economists, political scientists, sociologists, and even
psychologists. Moreover, researchers have tackled different tasks:
some studied the causes of malfeasance and others the consequences
of corrupt behavior. A vast majority of these studies advance long
lists of policy prescriptions on how to deal with the problem. So,
what new does this study offer? What does it do and what does it not
attempt to do?
The book is about the reasons why some postcommunist societies
are more prone to corruption than others and about the effects of pub-
lic office abuse on mass political behavior. My purpose is not to show
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how and why the Eastern European countries are more or less corrupt
than other regions in the world; neither is it to explain that corrupt
practices also existed during communism. These themes have been
explored quite extensively in the literature. We do know today, with a
reasonable degree of certainty, that Eastern Europe is more corrupt
than many Western consolidated democracies and that public office
abuse was not absent there before 1989. Instead, I analyze the reasons
why political life has been freer from corruption in some places (e.g.,
in Estonia and Slovenia) than elsewhere in the region (especially in
Russia and Albania). I also examine the damaging impact of the per-
ceived lack of elite integrity on common people as citizens.
Compared to previous published work, I do not advance a partic-
ular typology of corruption nor do I rank order particular corrupt acts
or their perpetrators. Karklins’s (2005) attempt in this direction
already provides an exhaustive list of possible forms based on level of
interaction. Another, more parsimonious, typology was offered by the
World Bank, which unbundles the phenomenon between state capture
and administrative corruption (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000).
I concur with Holmes (2006, 42–43) that building a more sophisticat-
ed typology of corruption is warranted. This work, however, is direct-
ed in different avenues of inquiry. I hope that the findings in the
empirical chapters of the book will inform the future enterprise of
classifying corruption.
Another important way in which this study differs from previous
research is methodological in nature, but also bears theoretical and
practical implications. To fulfill my primary aim, to explain the
causes and consequences of corruption after communism, I rely pri-
marily on multivariate analysis of data from a large number of
states. By accounting for competing arguments about what causes
corruption and how it shapes citizen participation, I was able to iso-
late the role of specific political, economic, and social configura-
tions perceived as influential in democratic accountability practices.
This has not been done before, at least not in studies on postcommu-
nist corruption. From the viewpoint of practitioners, the most valu-
able insights that such an approach can produce are policy related.
However, readers are discouraged from waiting for yet another list
of anticorruption policies in the conclusions of the study. The diver-
sity in the socioeconomic and competitive structure of Eastern
European politics is large enough to require carefully crafted instead
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of automatic policy responses to the complex phenomenon of cor-
ruption. The knowledge derived from the analyses in this book will
hopefully direct politicians, activists, and citizens to the optimum
answers for their societies.
To summarize, this is a scholarly book in which I attempt to
make three main contributions to the study of corruption and demo-
cratic transition. First, I search for theoretical arguments made in
extant literature to explain political corruption in the context of post-
communist democratic and market reforms. In the study, I identify
domestic and international factors relevant to Eastern Europe that
shape the formation of politicians’ preferences, open opportunities for
engagement in corrupt acts, and constrain incentives for illegal
enrichment. Second, I advance tentative answers to the substantial
question about how to approach corruption. The findings of my study
are policy relevant, although I propose no particular anticorruption
strategy. Third, by focusing on the experience of postcommunist tran-
sitions, I build an understanding of how institutionally unstable and
economically weaker countries are especially vulnerable to corrup-
tion. Moreover, the case studies of Balkan countries help us under-
stand the conditions under which anticorruption policies may be
effective when applied to societies that not only are postcommunist,
but carry an even longer tradition of distrust of the central govern-
ment and its institutions.
The adoption of a cross-national empirical approach helps to
advance the research program on political corruption in the post-
communist world.13 There is an urgent need for a comprehensive
explanation of processes that have the potential to put at risk demo-
cratic reforms and achievements in the region. In these terms, such
a book has been long overdue. The book is also distinct in its sub-
ject and scope. Using a systematic approach in this study, I com-
pared incidents of corrupt activities and public perceptions of them
across a large number of countries. At the same time, I also investi-
gated in depth concrete mechanisms of fraudulent practices under-
mining the legitimacy of democratic governance. Finally, gathering
comparable information for several countries over time is a formi-
dable task that I carried out with caution regarding data validity and
sources. As described earlier, I used a unique mix of data sets com-




Along with the introduction and the conclusion, the book includes
three main parts. In the first part (Chapters 2 and 3), I draw on exist-
ing literature to identify reasons for the spread of corruptiveness
among postcommunist political elites. In the second part (Chapters 4
through 7), I analyze particular sources of corruption and, in the third
part (Chapters 8 and 9), I investigate how politicians’ corrupt behav-
ior affects mass democratic behavior in Eastern Europe.
In the next two chapters, I explore the validity of some previously
developed arguments about what makes some countries more prone
to corruption than others. I do this from a theoretical perspective in
Chapter 2, constructing a framework that incorporates factors rele-
vant to the postcommunist environment. The working assumption
here is that participants in possible corrupt activities are rational play-
ers who decide whether to engage in such interactions after calculat-
ing the benefits and the costs from these. As readers will see, this cal-
culus may be affected by considerations for domestic and
international opportunities and constraints. While the rationalist
vision is at the heart of my explanation of corruption, I cannot ignore
its most popular challenger, the culturalist approach. In the rest of the
second chapter, I discuss whether culture may be an effective predic-
tor of the different levels of corruption in the former communist
countries and propose ways in which a culturalist perspective may
benefit the analyses in this book.
In Chapter 3, I meet theory with reality in a first set of empirical
tests. I start by operationalizing the internal and external factors iden-
tified earlier. The former include the electoral method as enhancing
transparency and accountability, the regulatory burden on business
operations as an opportunity for overtaxation, and the national econo-
my as a facilitator of anticorruption policy enforcement. The latter
group of factors involves openness to foreign trade, which raises the
costs of malfeasance, and integration with the European Union as a
motivating force to reduce corruption. Based on the results from the
regression tests, I propose directions in which the analysis should
expand in order to develop a clearer picture of why corruption levels
are different across Eastern Europe.
In the four chapters that follow, I look at various sources and
deterrents of corrupt behavior in postcommunist politics. Chapter 4
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goes beyond the formal methods of allocation of mandates and adds
the rules adopted in various countries to regulate campaign finance.
I start my investigation with a review of the party finance regimes
that evolved after 1989 with the development of the young party
systems. My investigation continues with an evaluation of data
revealing the presence and negative impact of private companies’
contributions in violation of the law. As I show in the final part of
that chapter, some aspects of the finance regulation are correlated
with the levels of corruption, a result that can have implications for
the debate around the merit of separate policy instruments. What
that analysis does not reveal is what the mechanisms of corrupt
interactions between politicians and private interests are and the
potentially harmful consequences of these connections. But in
Chapter 5, I do exactly this by constructing and running a case study
of the friendly circles that emerged around political parties in
Bulgaria after 1989. By analyzing in depth the genesis and persis-
tence of these powerful groupings, I seek to unveil their structure
and forms of public-private interdependence.
In Chapter 6 I expand the investigation by exploring the capacity,
state and nonstate, of countries to tackle corruption. That chapter
comes to address the issue of a lack of meaningful results even when
political will seems to exist. One obvious answer, though still not sys-
tematically analyzed in the postcommunist context, is the capability
of the political system to stand against and contain corruption. I argue
that both a materially and institutionally stronger state and an
enabling social environment are needed for anticorruption efforts to
succeed. Interestingly, better-paid public officials and sustainable
civil organizations emerge as key contributors to state capacity for
fighting malfeasance. These answers are provocative, given the popu-
lar negative view in Eastern Europe about increasing bureaucrats’
salaries and the weak civil societies inherited from communism.
My aim in Chapter 7 is to examine the role of international pres-
sure on reducing corruption in the postcommunist states. I focus on
the influence of the European Union, which has been different across
space and over time due to variations in the progress of the EU acces-
sion process. The geographic scope of my study, involving many
postcommunist countries, and the long range of years under investi-
gation provide an opportunity to track down whether the EU has been
effective in encouraging decisive measures against corruption. To
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account for possible interference of cultural diversity, I selected coun-
tries from the same subregion and with the same historical roots from
the Balkans. As the results show, the EU has been able to create
incentives for more active anticorruption engagement, but success has
been slow and to some extent dependent on the stage of integration.
Finally, the findings that I report in this chapter speak about the con-
tribution of European integration to cleaner public affairs manage-
ment as separate and independent from the process of liberalization
and market reforms.
In Chapters 8 and 9, I analyze the impact of corruption on how
the Eastern Europeans feel about the government institutions, democ-
racy, and voting. I thereby seek to develop a comprehensive picture of
the less visible impacts of corrupt activities that, however, can be of
crucial importance for preserving the legitimacy of the democratic
order. The two chapters argue that perceptions of widespread corrup-
tion damage public confidence in institutions and affect voter deci-
sions. As I show in Chapter 8, the harmful effect of corruption is
much stronger in the case of institutional trust than in that of democ-
racy as an ideal. Assessing the balance between abstention in elec-
tions and voting the corrupt rulers out, I also conclude Chapter 9 on a
less than expected pessimistic note. Although the corrosive effects of
corruption are confirmed in general, there are some signs that democ-
racy in the region is not so fragile.
From the beginning of this inquiry, I embraced a rational
choice approach. And at the end, readers deserve to be given a fair
assessment of what has been accomplished by using such a per-
spective. In Chapter 10, I summarize the findings and discuss them
in the light of central debates in the literature about the institutional
and cultural sources of corruption. My effort throughout the book
to keep the analyses sensitive to alternative explanations pays off
and, in that concluding chapter, I elaborate on its merit for the
validity of the findings. The conclusions advanced in the final chap-
ter assign credit to a set of institutional features allowing, prevent-
ing, or reducing corruption. Drawing on the analyses that expand
beyond the effect of electoral systems, I highlight the relevance of
particular party finance mechanisms, informal private-public net-
works, and administrative reform in Eastern Europe. My conclud-
ing discussion also focuses on the enabling impacts of the domestic
and the external environment represented by civil society organiza-
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tions and the European Union. As it became clear toward the end of
my project, institutions do play a vital role in shaping incentives for
and against corruption in particular contexts. It is the magnitude of
their effects that may vary by cultural distinctiveness, to the extent
to which Eastern European societies differ with regard to their pre-
communist past.
Notes
1. Some earlier studies propose that the improper exchange of favors in
the public sector may have a positive impact on development, mainly by
improving bureaucratic efficiency (Leff 1964; Huntington 1968; Goldsmith
1999). Yet a consensus seems to be emerging that corruption has a predomi-
nantly negative effect, especially in unstable political environments. For
example, empirical research suggests that corruption slows economic growth
(Mauro 1995); impedes the inflow of investment (Knack and Keefer 1995;
Tanzi and Davoodi 1997); increases social inequality (Rothstein and Uslaner
2005); favors the expansion of the unofficial economy (Johnson, Kaufmann,
and Zoido-Lobaton 1999); depresses citizens’ sense of well-being (Tavits
2008); and threatens democratic legitimacy (Moran 2001). Even Huntington,
who assumes a positive association of corruption with modernization, recog-
nizes that societies where corruption is already pervasive may not benefit
from it as a “lubricant easing the path to modernization” (1968, 69). As is
argued elsewhere, the communist totalitarian systems from which the new
Eastern European countries started to depart in 1989 were not free from graft
and related organized crime (Simis 1982; Moran 2001; Holmes 2006). These
arguments reinforce an expectation that corruption in those countries is more
likely to have unfavorable consequences, rather than to increase efficiency or
promote entrepreneurship.
2. For more detail on the chronology of subsequent waves of corruption
and anticorruption scholarship and public debate in general, see Schmidt
(2007).
3. Offe (2004, 77) offers a list of practices, broadly perceived as wrong-
doings that are “neighboring” the domain of political corruption: fraud,
embezzlement, theft, nepotism, cronyism, gifts, donations, lobbying, and
others. Although associated with corruption, he argues, it remains unclear
which of them would fall within the definitional boundaries determining the
scope of corrupt phenomena.
4. Johnston’s (2005b, 12) exact definition is “the abuse of public roles or
resources for private benefit.” He, however, cautions that the meaning and
the clarity of these terms may vary across societies.
5. I employ the term grand here to distinguish corruption at the highest
levels of political authority (executive, legislative, and the bureaucracy) from
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improper payments made during citizens’ everyday interactions with low-
level bureaucrats and administrators. For a different use of the term grand
corruption, see Jain (2001, 74) who classifies corruption in democratic soci-
eties as grand (of political elites), bureaucratic (of bureaucrats), and legisla-
tive (of parliamentarians).
6. For extensive reviews of existing measures of corruption, see Rose-
Ackerman (1999), Jain (2001), and Lambsdorff (2006).
7. Galtung (2006, 109–123), for example, summarizes the “failings” of
the TICPI in problem groups including country coverage and imprecise
sources and definitions.
8. For a comprehensive review of the use of composite indexes as mea-
sures of corruption, see Knack (2007) and Treisman (2007).
9. Results from the World Values Survey are available at
www.worldvaluessurvey.org, from the special Eurobarometers at http://ec
.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm, and from the CSES at www
.cses.org.
10. Using both TICPI and WBI data will ensure more robust results and
confidence in the findings. The TICPI measures corruption in the public sec-
tor, using the opinions of resident and nonresident country experts and busi-
ness leaders. Thus, it is “a survey of surveys” that ranges from 0 (most cor-
rupt) to 10 (least corrupt). It was first constructed by Johann Lambsdorff
(1999) to assist Transparency International in pursuing its objectives as a
global coalition against corruption (for more details on the methodology
behind the TICPI, see www.transparency.org/cpi). The WBI is also based on
surveys, of individuals familiar with government operations, country analysts
from international agencies such as the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, expert assessments of the US State Department and the
French Finance Ministry, nongovernmental organizations, and commercial
business information providers such as the Economist Intelligence Unit
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, 6–7). The WBI uses year-to-year
comparable sources and adjusts for in-unit assessment differences; it ranges
from –2.5 (most corrupt) to 2.5 (least corrupt). WBI yearly assigned scores
by country are available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi
/index.asp. The Transparency International and the World Bank indexes are
in agreement—they vary together well, as shown by the Pearson correlation
parameter of .920 (significant at the 0.000 level) estimated for the data used
in my analyses.
11. This index uses information on public opinion, officials’ business
interests, and conflict of interest and financial disclosure legislation (Nations
in Transit 2009). The NIT ranges on a scale from 1 (least corrupt) to 7 (most
corrupt). This index relies on a rougher measurement and provides a shorter
time series (starting in 2000) than the TICPI and the WBI.
12. In the perfect case scenario, information produced by participants and
by direct observers would be most useful. However, it is difficult to find pri-
mary sources for research on elusive structures such as friendly circles in
which politicians and private entrepreneurs engage. The participants not only
prefer that these activities are hidden, but they do everything possible to keep
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such connections confidential. One rare exception is the public admissions of
Ahmed Dogan, leader of a political party in Bulgaria, which offer direct evi-
dence for the existence and operation of the circles. During my fieldwork in
Bulgaria in the summer of 2009, I spoke with investigative journalists and
NGO experts. They referred me to various publications, including their own,
but were not willing to provide details—not surprising given the rise of
organized crime and the recent instances of journalists being beaten. Thus,
the sources used in Chapter 5 are mainly secondary (i.e., books and newspa-
per articles on the topic).
13. Dorhoi’s (2006) dissertation is also empirical and involves a large
number of Eastern European transitional countries, but it is oriented more
toward adopted anticorruption policies and the factors accounting for their
intensity.
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